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Creating an ‘Island of Peace’ or ‘Freezing’ the Conflict? The Implications of the Southern 
Transitional Council on Yemen’s Peace Process 
 
Robert Forster, Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract:  
This paper addresses the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Southern 
Yemen and assesses how to understand its significance in the current attempt to end the 
conflict. Providing background and an analysis of the Council and the cause of its emergence, 
the paper argues that the STC case is useful for considering, more generally, how sub-state 
political settlements emerging during conflict can help or hurt conflict resolution attempts at 
the national level.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
With the erosion of state-power in the face of conflict, functional equivalents of government 
are usually rapidly adopted, supported by systemic practices i  or an array of local and 
international actors.ii The consolidation of local governance is beneficial in the short term due 
to its capacity to provide security, governance and economic welfareiii in situations of grave 
need. Moreover, when local governance is based on traditional practices and representation 
is accepted as legitimate or at least ‘good enough’, then such organisations can form a 
consolidated bargaining bloc that strengthen local representation in national level peace 
processes.  
 
However, the appearance of local governance entities during times of conflict can also clash 
with technocratic approaches iv to peace processes pursued by national and international 
actors. As time progresses and local governance processes institutionalize, they may highlight 
issues of legitimacy that challenge state supremacy on the local and regional levels. In some 
cases, they can result in the creation of so-called ‘quasi-states’ that maintain aspects of 
governance such as the provision of security or revenue collection/generation independent 
of the internationally recognised state.v However, political and economic development of 
such entities is typically hampered by a lack of formal state recognition which poses barriers 
to aid programmes, trade and fiscal management. Even if a ceasefire is agreed, the lack of a 
political framework aiming to normalize relations with the state in question may ‘freeze’ the 
conflict as the number of acceptable alternatives become limited.vi 
 
These dilemmas are currently playing out in the case of the newly formed Southern 
Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. This paper addresses the emergence of the STC and 
assesses how to understand its significance in the current attempt to end the conflict, with a 
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view to exploring the role of sub-national settlements within an unresolved peace process 
more generally. The paper considers whether the ways in which the development in Yemen 
helps or hurts attempts to reach a national political settlement capable of resolving the 
conflict across the country. 
 
 
 
The Emergence of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen 
 
On May 11, 2017, Aden’s former-Governor, Aidrous al-Zubaydi, stood in front of the flag of 
former-South Yemen and announced the creation of the 26-member Southern Transitional 
Council (STC). vii According to Southern Movement members, the announcement was a 
culmination of discussions that had been going on for several months.viii However, the process 
was catalysed following armed clashes at Aden Airport in mid-April between President of the 
UN-backed Yemeni Government, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and then-Governor Zubaydi.ix On 
April 27, 2017, Hadi responded by sacking Zubaydi as well as Hani Ali bin Burayk, Yemen’s 
former-Minister of State.x  
 
Within a week after Zubaydi’s dismissal, a mass rally in opposition to President Hadi’s decision 
was organised by the Southern Movement, a coalition of political factions championing 
various degrees of political autonomy for Yemen’s South and locally known the al-Hirak.xi 
Broadcasting the Historic Aden Declaration, the protestors proceeded to frame Zubaydi’s 
removal from office as an act of aggression towards to South by Hadi, making reference to 
Hadi’s role in defeating the South in the 1994 Civil War.xii The location of the rally in Khor 
Maksar, Aden – the site of vicious fighting during the Battle of Aden in 2015 – underscored 
the hardships of the Southern struggle further. The Declaration went on to “authorize” 
Zubaydi to create a “national political leadership” to represent the south based on the “legal 
authority from the will of the people of the South.”xiii During the week that followed, Zubaydi 
documented meetings with civil society, women’s organisations, tribal leaders and Southern 
politicians, before his public announcement of the formation of the STC.xiv 
 
The Southern Question lingers 
 
This latest conflagration taps into a longer-standing question over the relationship of the 
South to the rest of Yemen.  The ‘Southern Question’ has lingered over Yemen’s transition 
process since before the Yemeni revolution of 2011. It was only in May 1990 that North and 
South Yemen unified as the leadership of both countries struggled financially and politically.xv 
The defeat of the South in the 1994 Civil War led to the mass dismissal of Southern civil 
servants and military officials, confiscation of property, and the systematic transfer of wealth 
from the oil rich southern province of Hadramawt to the North.xvi In 2007, the Hirak was 
formed to protest these practices for which they were met with a heavy-handed response by 
state security under President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In a process similar to the consolidation of 
the Houthi Movement – a Zaydi revivalist movement turned militant in the early 2000s – state 
repression cemented the Hirak’s resolve and their calls for secession.  
 
The Yemen Revolution in 2011 gave the Hirak, in addition to other non-state groups such as 
the Houthi Movement, the opportunity to mobilize against the 33-year regime of President 
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Ali Abdullah Saleh under a broader umbrella of popular and elite discontent. Fearing a de-
stabilized Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council led by Saudi Arabia alongside the United 
Nations, negotiated the departure of President Saleh and his replacement by Vice-President 
Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi.xvii This was successfully completed during the first phase of the 
transition, meanwhile the second stage sought to reform the factionalized military in parallel 
to launching a broadly inclusive National Dialogue to reform Yemen’s constitution. Although 
a subsection of the National Dialogue Conference of 2013-2014 was dedicated to solving the 
Southern Issue in a transparent and inclusive manner, xviii  the process was marred by 
differences within the Hirak, assassinations, and the bias selection of more moderate Hirak 
representatives by conference organisers, thus discrediting the process. 
 
At the end of the conference, given the absence of agreement, the six-state federal system 
proposed and pushed through by President Hadi was rejected by the Hirak in addition to 
Houthis. In response, the Houthis justified their southward expansion into the capital, Sana’a, 
on the basis of the unjust distribution of territory between the newly proposed states and a 
lack of consultation on the matter. While the Hadi government shifted Yemen’s capital from 
Sana’a to Aden in September 2014, the political crisis deepened, eventually spurring the 
Houthi takeover of Aden in early 2015.  
 
The capture of Aden by the Houthis in 2015 echoed the Northern incursions of the 1994 Civil 
War. In reaction, the Southern Movement and their affiliated Southern Resistance militias 
played a key role alongside the Arab Coalition in driving the Houthis out of Aden and Lahj 
governorates. With the Yemeni government predominantly based in Riyadh and the military 
divided, the Southern Resistance filled the security vacuum in Aden taking over key security 
responsibilities alongside the forces of the Arab Coalition. However, lack of payment by the 
Yemeni government, sparked multiple protests by Southern Resistance members. xix 
Meanwhile, on the national level, a “silent power struggle” between Hadi and members of 
his government, including former-Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, continued to destabilise the 
political and security environment in the areas re-captured from the Houthis.xx 
 
Seeking Legitimacy 
 
The creation of the Southern Transitional Council is more than a local response to the 
‘Southern Question’ and is reflective of three trends within the Yemeni conflict.  
 
First, the STC is a product of the disconnect in goals between the Hadi government and local 
constituencies within Yemen. This disconnect is particularly evident in the government’s call 
for Saudi intervention, that instituted a naval blockage at the expense of non-aligned Yemeni 
civilians.xxi Moreover, the pro-Hadi coalition of political entities and militias, were united not-
so-much by a pro-Hadi stance as an anti-Houthi position.xxii Thus, the alliances of the Hadi 
government – particularly with a militarily empowered Hirak – were likely to come into 
question. Moreover, the governing style of Hadi, who instigated multiple reshuffles of the 
Cabinet and other political appointments – four since December 2015 xxiii  – has been 
disruptive to the peace process and appear to be founded on political loyalty rather than 
professional capability.  
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The disconnect between the Government-in-exile and local constituencies is further 
reinforced in the South after large areas ceased being on the frontline. This ties into the 
second trend, which is a lack of progress in regards to the humanitarian situation as well as 
reconstruction for which the Yemeni Government is unable to secure sufficient funding.xxiv In 
addition, the national-level Yemeni peace process has remained deadlocked since August 
2016. On the other hand, in the South there has been an attempt in consolidating political 
coalitions and goals since the expulsion of al-Qaeda from Mukalla in April 2016. Such a process 
is evident beyond the establishment of the STC, in the outcomes of the Inclusive Hadramawt 
Conference of April 23, 2017, that consolidated the political aims of Hadramawt’s state, 
military and tribal leaders.xxv   
 
The third trend embodied in the STC is the establishment of localised political entities that 
assume governance responsibilities. Throughout Yemen’s statebuilding experience, the 
inability of the state to penetrate into the periphery has led to the creation of rival governance 
organisations based on kinship or ideological affiliations ranging from tribal councils, military 
commander fiefdoms or pockets of al-Qaeda control. In this environment, the post-liberation 
period in Aden was marked by insecurity and an inability of the Hadi government and Arab 
Coalition to assert full control due to challenges from rival groups including the Southern 
Resistance. Consolidation of Aden under Governor Zubaydi following his appointment in 
December 2015 with support from the UAE, has placed ownership of the South back “into the 
hands of its sons.”xxvi However, despite playing an essential role in Aden’s liberation and 
affirming greater control over the region, these gains have not translated to a greater political 
voice on the national level. At the Kuwait round of peace negotiations held between May and 
August 2016, for example, Southern Movement leaders were largely absent,xxvii hence fueling 
further frustration. 
 
The core of the abovementioned tensions ultimately implicate questions of legitimacy. For 
Hadi’s government is facing a challenge that meets most transitional governments. Indeed, 
the challenge of maintaining a semblance of legitimacy becomes increasingly difficult as they 
attempt to reconcile a non-democratic appointed governmental body with democratic 
rhetoric and the promise of reform. Both the international community and the Yemeni 
Government have attempted to short-cut this process by simply labelling Hadi’s regime as the 
‘legitimate government’ in official documentation and rhetoric. However, a lack of 
improvement in conditions on the ground, political maneuvering by government officials with 
self-serving undertones, in addition to government officials operating from Riyadh rather 
than Yemen, together act to erode the goodwill among a struggling population whose lives 
are at the whim of individuals hundreds of miles away.  
 
The Politics of Recognition 
 
Among its tasks, the STC placed emphasis on ensuring “a continued alliance with the Arab 
Coalition against the Iranian intrusion into the area, and a partnership with the international 
community in fighting terrorism.”xxviii However, the initial response by international actors 
including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League has been 
overwhelmingly negative. Reactions have varied from being “disturbed” by the 
development.xxix  Others warned that the council will ultimately entrench divisions within 
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Yemen and potentially prolong the war,xxx or it will weaken the alliance giving an upper hand 
to the forces of President Saleh and the Houthis.xxxi 
 
Nonetheless, within the first four weeks of its creation, STC members were busy building 
bridges internationally. Although Zubaydi and bin Burayk were reputedly rebuked by Saudi 
officials after flying to Riyadh,xxxii STC member Lutfi Shatara reportedly met with Western 
officials, while other delegations allegedly flew to Egypt and the UAE.xxxiii The rejection by 
Saudi Arabia seems to be an attempt at avoiding legitimizing the STC, however, their 
simultaneous arrival in Riyadh with that of UN Special Envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, has 
led to speculation of potential meetings between them. 
 
Domestically, the Council has also been met with diverse reactions. Within weeks of the STC’s 
formation, Hadi dismissed the governors of Hadramawt, Shabwah and Socotra for their 
involvement with the council.xxxiv From a legal perspective, the announcement of the STC 
could be perceived as a coup d’état against President Hadi in the South. As a result, it is no 
surprise that President Hadi rejected the formation of the STC. Hadi supported his stance by 
arguing that the Council contradicted “the three foundations agreed upon locally, regionally 
and internationally – the Gulf Initiative and its Executive Mechanism, the National Dialogue 
Conference's outcomes and the United Nation's Resolution 2216.” xxxv  Indeed, the path 
dependency created by these documents and their legal underpinning under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter have been an asset for the Hadi government in justifying their stance in stalled 
peace negotiations with the Houthis and former-President Saleh.xxxvi  
 
Opinions among other national and Northern actors has been mixed. In late July, Hadi’s 
former-Prime Minister Khalid Bahah allegedly assured the STC of his support.xxxvii Meanwhile, 
a Houthi representative dubbed the STC a product of American imperialismxxxviii whereas one 
commentator labelled the STC a manifestation of Iranian expansionism.xxxix 
 
Within the South, however, reactions have been predominantly positive. The former-
President of the South and leader of one of the largest Hirak factions, Ali Salem al-Beidh, 
considered the STC “a great historical achievement.”xl The five provincial governors of al-
Dhale, Shabwah, Lahj, Hadramawt and Socotra who form part of the Council, were also 
positively inclined to its aims. However, Governor of Hadramawt, Ahmed Said bin Burayk, also 
stressed “the recognition of the role of the President of legitimacy Hadi as the consensus 
President” in the early stage.xli  
 
However, opposition to the STC emerged among other leading figures within the Southern 
Movement. Maj. Gen. Nasser Ali al-Nuba, a Southern Movement founder, declared the 
Council “illegitimate” and organised protests against it in Shabwah’s provincial capital, 
Attaq.xlii A similar opinion was held by Hassan Baum, another Southern Movement founder 
and head of the faction known as the High Council of the Revolutionary Movement.xliii In 
addition, some of the Hadramawt tribes issued a statement reiterating their support for 
President Hadi.xliv Thus, there are grounds that the STC’s aims of representing ‘united South’ 
may be contested. 
 
The Pitfalls and Opportunities of Sub-state Political Settlements 
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The creation of the STC exposes the weaknesses of internationally-led technocratic peace 
processes that contrast sharply to the political and everyday aspect of conflict resolution. 
While the national peace processes pursues an elusive elite between national elites and geo-
political allies with regard to stopping the violence, developments in the South have a more 
bottom-up relationship to people affected by conflict. Yet, the emergence of sub-national 
settlements places peacemakers in a difficult position because developments on the ground 
outpace the trajectory of incremental peace processes and go beyond the scripted nature of 
political roadmaps.  
 
In the case of Yemen, regional approaches to the Council are ultimately framed by two 
aspects. First are internal tensions between the Arab Coalition members of Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates that view the fate of the STC through respective spheres of 
influence. Second is that the legal justification of the Arab Coalition interventions rests with 
the continuation of Hadi as Yemen’s president. Nonetheless, the question that arises is 
whether the emergence of a strong regional entity with a clear position, will help or hurt 
Yemen’s peace negotiations.  
 
From a positive perspective, the STC could represent an opportunity for Southern Yemenis 
and members of the international community. The fractured nature of the South has posed 
considerable difficulties in consolidating the aims of Southerners since the Hirak first 
emerged, resulting in competing voices and in-fighting. Such in-fighting has made it easier to 
exclude the movement from negotiations. For peace processes such heterogeneity in 
demands are difficult to overcome as certain sticking-points stall negotiations. Reminiscent 
of the two platforms that emerged to represent the positions of Tuareg rebels in the Mali 
intra-Azawad peace process after 2012,xlv the STC could form the basis of a more coherent 
coalition, than what currently exists in Yemen (although to the detriment of plurality).  
 
In addition, in states where the old political settlement has ruptured and the new settlement 
has yet to fully manifest, local governance entities are instrumental in forming ‘Islands of 
Peace’ through the resolution of localized disputes.xlvi The theory is that creating peaceful 
regions within countries can be a way of stabilizing that which can be stabilized, and thus 
creating a vision and will for greater peace. Legitimate governance by the STC with assistance 
from the Emirates could also be a means of consolidating governance in the South. Tackling 
issues of security, for example, could be accomplished via a more astute recognition of the 
needs that must be addressed, proposing local solutions to issues of disarmament and 
security reform, as well as a more in-depth knowledge of context and place when tackling the 
al-Qaeda insurgency. 
 
On the other hand, consolidation of local governance can also viewed as operating to ‘spoil’ 
the peace processes for five reasons. First, local governance institutions pose a challenge to 
technocratic means of conflict resolution that often have entrenched path dependencies 
which are difficult to break. Such institutions diverge from these processes as they were not 
party to previous rounds of negotiation and hence where not factored into any proposed 
roadmap. Second, local governance institutions challenge the legitimacy of internationally-
backed governments. Thus, as with armed groups, if governments concede to the demands 
of such local institutions it may encourage their emergence elsewhere. Third, as indicated by 
Pokalova, when organisations institutionalize over time there become fewer available options 
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for their peaceful inclusion in the process and as a result the conflict ‘freezes’.xlvii In this 
context, institutionalized local governments are often viewed as waystations to secession 
although this is not necessarily the case. Fourth, the formation of local governance entities 
may agitate regional divisions by provoking a backlash from opposing local actors and 
exacerbate conflict. And lastly, conflict may also be exacerbated should a local governance 
organisation fail after a period of consolidation, due to either internal or external pressures.  
 
To illustrate these points, the case of Somalia offers two converse examples of how local 
governance structures have interacted with the ‘mother’ state.  Somaliland offers an example 
of a frozen conflict wherein the development of local structure have solidified into a de factor 
statehood where it seems unlikely that the state will join the rest of Somalia following over 
25 years of de facto independence. However, it is also unlikely that statehood will be 
internationally recognized. In contrast, similar processes of local settlement in Puntland, 
possibly due to its position closer to Mogadishu and its different history, and an influx of 
national and international rents to combat crime and piracy, offers an example of how a sub-
state political settlement can support the development of a greater federal entity. 
 
With regard to Yemen, the approach taken by the GCC member states and President Hadi to 
the STC is that it is antithetical to the UN-led peace process. However, the outright rejection 
of the STC by the majority of regional actors threatens to make their predictions of 
‘entrenched divisions’ a self-fulfilling prophecy. Particularly if reports of counter-maneuvering 
by President Hadi and Saudi Arabia to form an opposing council of Southern activists to 
challenge the STC are correct.xlviii Moreover, hostility towards Saudi Arabia by the Houthis 
highlight the difficulty in sharing a long and porous border Yemen. In addition, considering 
the terms under which the 2000 border treaty between Riyadh and President Saleh was 
signed,xlix it may not be in the best interest of Riyadh to reject the STC outright.  
 
Potential Scenarios 
 
What might be the outcomes of this development.  Beyond “managing and representing the 
South, domestically and internationally,”l the short term aims of the STC remain unclear. By 
decree the Council may extend its authority as it deems necessary, although by the time of 
its meeting in Aden on July 5, it has yet to do so.li If the STC manages to maintain its position, 
various possible scenarios exist. However, a key factor in any of the following scenarios is the 
level of Emirati support, particularly if the STC is designated a spoiler, whereby wherein the 
UAE could form a ‘life-line’ for the flow of goods and people into Southern Yemen. 
 
The first potential scenario is the possibility of the STC declaring independence. However, the 
norm of protecting state integrity means that this option will not be supported 
internationally, and this makes it unattractive. Moreover, as the majority of Yemen’s fossil 
fuels is located in Hadramawt attempted secession may fuel further conflict. If independence 
does occur, it is likely to either be temporary in nature, or the foundation of a de facto pseudo-
state unrecognized by the international community, but for all intents and purposes an 
independent territorial entity such as Somaliland. Although a long-term goal, secession is 
more likely to be attainable by the South if undertaken transparently or partnership with 
neighbouring states and the international community and with deference to the Yemeni 
government in exile.  
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Nonetheless, a move towards independence appears to be in progress. The former-Governor 
of Hadramawt, Ahmed bin Burayk, in an interview with Aden al-Ghad on June 18, 2017, spoke 
of the potential of declaring a new state “between September and October [2017].”lii This 
independent state would itself be based on a federal model with the view of providing a level 
of self-governance with Hadramis in mind.liii As reported by al-Arabi al-Jadeed support from 
Hadramawt is essential for the Southern project to work. However, the situation remains 
precarious since including Hadramawt within an independent Southern state would erase the 
opportunity for Hadrami autonomy within a united Yemen that could be equally or more 
beneficial.liv 
 
The second scenario is that the development could be rolled into a national solution based 
on federalism, if the federal framework was re-written from Hadi’s six states to become a 
two-state federal framework. In such a scenario, the STC could become the first foundation 
of a regional government in the South, with a northern counterpart possibly found in the High 
Political Council that was announced by the Houthis and General People’s Congress in July 
2016.lv In such a case, the STC could represent an emerging federal entity representing a 
united South in any future peace negotiations, as hoped by Bashraheel Hisham Bashraheel, 
Deputy Editor of the Aden-based Al-Ayyam newspaper.lvi This also appears to be the original 
aimlvii of the former-Governor of Hadramawt, Ahmed bin Burayk, who was careful to voice 
the legitimacy of Hadi while supporting the Council,lviii but now appears to have shifted his 
position towards independence.lix To some extent, the second scenario mirrors the Somali 
model of incremental federalism by incorporating bottom-up regional entities into a federal 
structure wherein a coherent and fairly legitimate leadership can be formed, although not 
without its problems. 
 
The third scenario, which seems unlikely in the short-term considering current Emirati 
support, is the disintegration of the Council in the face of domestic and external pressure. As 
seen, the South is not entirely united under the banner of the STC and this could lead to a 
political crisis or even the outbreak of conflict between opposing factions. Moreover, many 
observers agree that the fate of the Council will depend on the level of support from the Arab 
Coalition and what is agreed upon between the Emirati and Saudi governments.lx As stated 
by the Yemeni Government Prime Minister, Ahmed bin Dagher, the coalition “could control 
some of the crisis in Aden”lxi despite the initial momentum of STC activity. The rumoured 
house arrest of the governors of Hadramawt, Shabwah and Socotra in late June appears to 
be such an attempt at control.lxii  
 
Another detriment to the longevity of the Council, however, would be how it tackles the same 
challenges that face the Hadi government, namely, the provision of services and security, as 
well as improving the standard of living and maintaining control of its forces. If these aspects 
are not accomplished, the any political gains will be fragile at best. In addition, decades of 
weak governance in the South means that the STC will likely face challenges by local political 
entities. The use of the ‘terrorism’ label has already become prominent in the rhetoric of the 
council, the defeat of which is listed as one of its overall goals.lxiii The means by which the STC 
deals with political contenders – particularly in light of rights violations in conjunction with 
Emirati supportlxiv – will be a valuable indicator of authoritarian entrenchment or democratic 
reform. 
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Conclusion 
 
A political constellation akin to Libya, with opposing regionalized governments and an 
internationally-backed government appears to be emerging in Yemen. Such a political 
constellation poses considerable difficulties in maintaining the current peace process laid out 
in UNSC resolution 2216. However, given that this peace process has been floundering, the 
STC can also be viewed as an opportunity to approach the South as a consolidated political 
bloc and for Southerners it will grant them the opportunity to effectively lobby for their cause 
at the negotiation table. Moreover the STC offers an opportunity to consolidate peace in the 
South and tackle wide-ranging issues from humanitarian aid, security, and the al-Qaeda 
insurgency from a more localized perspective. In the longer-term the STC may even form a 
preliminary governmental body absorbed into a decentralized, possibly federal, Yemen. 
 
However, the STC also emerged as a sub-state challenge to the legitimacy of President Hadi. 
Rather than approaching the Council and negotiating with it, the Yemeni government with 
Saudi-backing has, as a result, opted to maneuver against it. This is being accomplished 
through potential plans to create a rival council loyal to Hadi, in addition to limiting access 
and movement of some of STC members that have been stripped of their administrative 
positions. Moreover, intra-Southern rivalries can be stoked to limit the abilities of the Council 
to operate. For Hadi, this approach may succeed in dismantling the Council in the short-term. 
However, it is also likely to fuel resentment among those Southerners that view the body as 
legitimate and exacerbate North-South relations, possibly prolonging the conflict.   
 
In attempting to end the Yemeni conflict, international policy makers are confronted with a 
difficult decision, although their options are limited by the near unanimous international 
support for President Hadi, the GCC Initiative, the National Dialogue Outcomes and resolution 
2216. Nonetheless, their approach to the STC can have great implications for the continued 
stability in the South and curbing the spread of conflict through intra-regime factionalization 
forming an ‘island of peace’ in an otherwise conflict-torn state. However, it should be noted 
that, as with all regimes that arise in conflict, it is remains uncertain whether the STC will form 
a pathway to a more inclusive political settlement, or simply as a tool to consolidate power 
among Southern elites. 
 
More broadly, the Yemen case illustrates a conflict dynamic with global relevance, namely 
the tension between locally-driven and internationally-driven peace processes and the 
questions of legitimacy that arise. In addition, the Yemen case shows how local/regional 
consolidation of governance can create so-called ‘Islands of Peace’ and increase access to 
public goods in parts of the state. In addition, such consolidation has some potential for 
enabling negotiation between the national entities and sub-national entities by offering a 
clearer opposition platform. The opportunities, however, are contrasted by the threat that 
such governance entities pose to governments of countries in conflict, particularly when they 
align with secessionist claims.  
 
International actors would do well to harness the opportunities presented by such entities, 
while also managing the mis-match between national-level peace processes that they have 
committed to. When the situation is fluid and processes have stalled, it is shrewed to adopt 
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an open-minded approach and maintain open dialogue with all actors, particularly those with 
commitments to alleviate humanitarian needs on the ground.   
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